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regional organizations under the treaty could be accommodated. As to
Mr. O'Leary's query whether the United States should take the lead in
such a treaty, Mr. TvmERG felt that it should because of its experience in
the area, but other nations should be involved. The primary need was for
understanding and support from Congress and the Administration and an
informed public opinion with business groups being drawn in, as they
were at the time of the Havana Charter.
ROGER MORRISON
Reporter
COVERT INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The panel convened at 8:30 p.m., April 25, 1975, A. A. Fatouros* pre-
siding.
REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN
This panel differs from others recently held on covert intervention in
that it is not intended to deal primarily with the pure policy issues of
whether and how covert activities should be undertaken. It addresses in-
stead the international legal dimensions of the problem. President Ford's
casual comment in his September 16, 1974, news conference may be
understood as a challenge to all those concerned with international law to
determine, one way or another, its relevance to the issue. Does present-
day international law have anything to say about covert intervention?
Should it? If so, what is or should be the impact of legal regulation on the
policies of national governments? Leaving to the speakers the issue of the
lawfulness of covert intervention, the extent to which it is compatible
with or infringes upon international law, I shall explore in introduction
the forms and kinds of governmental activity that the term covers.
One principal distinguishing feature is that these are covert, secret
activities; but not all secret activities constitute covert intervention. A
former CIA official has provided a clear distinction between two kinds of
covert operations:
(1) intelligence collection, primarily espionage, or the obtaining of
intelligence by covert means; and (2) covert action, attempting to
influence the internal affairs of other nations -sometimes called
"intervention"-by covert means.1
Emphasis on secrecy is not enough. It is reasonably clear moreover
that we are not dealing with "intervention" in the traditional international
* School of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington).
I Richard Bissell, as quoted in the minutes of a 1968 meeting of the Council of Foreign
Relations, repr. in, Appendix, V. MARCHETTI AND J. D. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT
OF INTELLIGENCE 357, at 359 (1974).
law sense. Oppenheim's "dictatorial interference" involves action clearly
coercive in character. The point is made with exemplary clarity in a recent
study:
Interference might be defined as action taken to affect the actions of
others, dictatorial interference as action taken to prescribe the actions
of others. The crucial, but in international relations elusive, distinc-
tion for Oppenheim's definition is that between affecting some action
and prescribing its course. The notion of coercion might clarify this
distinction by introducing the idea of force. . . .Coercive inter-
ference, then, might identify intervention by its use or threat of force.2
Some forms of covert intervention may reach the borderlines of the tradi-
tional meaning; others seem not to. Coercion is not always present; formal
state involvement is missing, the action being "covert."
It is possible to identify at least four respects in which covert interven-
tion is a discrete form of action, although none of them provides total dis-
tinctiveness. Total clarity in definition is impossible, but fortunately,
it is also unnecessary; all that is needed is a reasonable elucidation of
meaning.
First, the actor. The instrument of the intervening state will be typically
its secret service, whatever its precise initials. Things are not that simple,
of course; partly because of the secrecy, there is often enormous difficulty
in ascertaining the actor's identity. Beyond that, the actor alone is not an
adequate criterion. Diplomatic personnel for instance often double as
secret agents, and then how can we tell in which capacity they are acting?
Even in their capacity as such, diplomats may engage in covert action.
A closely related, though distinct, situation is the relationship between
political parties. Problems arise particularly, if not solely, when one asso-
ciated party or group is in power in its own state, while the others are not
in theirs. We have a series of possible situations, with gradations in their
connection to a government, as, for instance, in the cases of relationships
among orthodox Communist parties, the assistance given to Greek resist-
ance against the recent military dictatorship by European Socialist
parties, or the recent moves around the Mediterranean by the neofascist
parties of the "New Order."
The panel is not concerned, however, with private efforts to affect
political outcomes in foreign countries, unless governmental aid is in-
volved directly or indirectly. There will be no discussion therefore of
such possible cases (which multinational enterprise spokesmen assure us
no longer occur today) as a payment of $1.25 million by a company to a
foreign government official to ensure favorable tax treatment.
Secondly, the panel is dealing with deliberate, planned action. It is not
primarily concerned with side effects of other action, whether foreseeable
or not, although these might in some cases constitute intervention.
The third feature of covert intervention is that it involves material
support (through funds, arms, technical advice, or promises of future
2 R. J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 7-8 (1974).
support) to one political group in a foreign state. Being attempts to
strengthen one political faction or to weaken another, these are primarily,
in Dr. Vincent's terms, efforts to affect or influence conduct, not to pre-
scribe. Mr. Bissell has provided a useful listing of possible action:
The scope of covert action could include: (1) political advice or
counsel; (2) subsidies to an individual; (3) financial support and
"technical assistance" to political parties; (4) support of private
organizations, including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives,
etc.; (5) covert propaganda; (6) "private" training of individuals and
exchange of persons; (7) economic operations; and (8) para-military
or political action operations designed to overthrow or to support a
regime .... 3
It must be stressed that secrecy is of the essence here, not only in the
sense that there would be embarrassment in disclosure, but primarily
because the fundamental quality of the desired outcome differs when
foreign action (or initiative) is or is not known to be present.
The fourth characteristic is closely related to the third. It has to do with
the immediate goal of the intervention, which is, typically, of a domestic
political character. It involves bringing to power, or retaining in power, a
particular group, or influencing a group's policies in matters primarily
domestic. There may be, and normally there is, a more distant goal as well,
with more immediate relevance to external affairs. After all, a foreign
political party is supported because it is expected (or in order to ensure)
that its policies, or its very presence in power, will favor the supporting
country's interests. And there may also be more specific external affairs
goals: a vote in the United Nations, return of expropriated property of
foreign nationals, etc. But the immediate goal remains one relating to
domestic affairs, as traditionally defined.
A last point, before leaving the floor to the speakers. Is covert interven-
tion a new phenomenon? Clearly not. There are too many examples from
the past, going back to the father of the law of nations himself. It appears
that as the Ambassador of Holland to France, Hugo Grotius was regularly
"funded" by the French. Is then the current interest in the phenomenon
merely a passing fad? I believe not, and I would cite two reasons, or rather
categories of reasons. First, the incidence of international interpenetra-
tion has greatly increased in the last few decades. There are many causes:
better communications, growth of a worldwide economy, more acute
ideological concerns, increased interaction among peoples in various
states. Although the two are by no means the same, and care should be
taken to avoid confusing them, it remains true that greater interpenetra-
tion facilitates covert intervention and makes the formulation and applica-
tion of clearcut rules more difficult. The second category of reasons in-
volves changes in our perception of international law. We no longer admit
passively that there may be an unbridged gap between international legal
doctrine and international practice, that the principles and values em-
bodied in the former can be routinely ignored in the latter. When con-
3 Bissell, supra note 1, at 364.
